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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOUTH AMERICA, (U)
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
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Military Intervention in South America

by

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 6, 1980

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→ Scholars have searched for the causes of military intervention into domestic political processes from a variety of analytical perspectives. Using independent variables suggested by some of these perspectives, a new operationalization of military intervention, and the technique of multiple regression, this paper explores the causes of military intervention in South America during the period from 1948 to 1967. The best predictors of military intervention, ~~the authors conclude,~~ are the level of political unrest, the incidence of nonviolent political protest demonstrations, and, negatively, the strength of the governing party. On the other hand, the best predictors of a withdrawal from political power by the armed forces are political unrest, unfavorable balances of trade, and the lack of institutionalization of the regime (as measured by regime age). ←

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Social scientists have examined the causes of military intervention into the domestic political process from a variety of analytical perspectives.¹ One approach emphasizes the relationship between military intervention and certain system-level aggregate phenomena such as economic development, industrialization, social mobilization, education, communication,² and the size of the middle class. A second approach concentrates on the military establishment itself--the backgrounds, values, and attitudes of the officer corps, the size and composition of the armed forces, and the traditional role of the military in the political system.³ A third approach to military intervention focusses on the role of political factors such as mass political participation, political parties, interest groups, political institutionalization, legitimacy, and countervailing forces.⁴ Finally, a fourth approach considers short-term trends in regime performance as possible precipitating or catalytic factors in military intervention.⁵

Although it is heuristically appealing to group research into carefully distinct categories, by no means should these approaches be seen as exclusionary in the sense that theorists seriously argue that the presence or absence of domestic military involvement can be totally explained by the use of only one of these approaches. Most theorists of military intervention would agree that no single, simple factor "explains" military intervention, but rather that a satisfactory general theory would likely include a broad range of variables drawn from

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several levels of approach. Stepan makes this point in the following manner: "Concerning military political behavior, it is my opinion that no one factor, whether institutional or otherwise, will have satisfactory explanatory or predictive power when taken alone."⁶ The objective, then, for this paper is to explore the relationship between military intervention and various independent variables suggested by the four approaches outlined above.

The universe for this study is the ten South American Republics and the time frame is 1948 to 1967. We chose South America as the area of study for two basic reasons: (1) Although far from homogeneous, the South American Republics have similar cultural, historical, geographical, and social backgrounds; and (2) the role of the military in South America has long been the subject of scholarly interest and, consequently, a large body of literature exists to guide the researcher. The particular time frame of 1948 to 1967 was chosen because it is the largest period for which data could be obtained for all of the republics.⁷ We gathered data for each of the ten countries for each of the twenty years under study, thus making a total of twenty nation-year observations for each country and a pooled universe of 200 nation-year observations for the continent as a whole.⁸

The Dependent Variable

In its most extreme form, military intervention involves the replacement of an incumbent government by the armed forces--the coup d'etat or golpe de estado. There is, however, a second aspect to military intervention--the scope and degree of military participation in the political system. Does the military govern? does it enjoy a veto power? or is it only an occasional pressure group? Both of these aspects of military intervention should be considered in the creation of a quantitative indicator of military intervention. Although military intervention is a complex concept, both military intervention in the form of coups d'etat and military intervention denoting the scope and degree of military influence in a political system can be conceptualized as a single variable. To do this, the following approach was adopted: First, if a coup occurred in the nation-year, a typology is created by answering two questions: (1) Against whom is the coup carried out? and (2) What type of government is established by the coup? A military coup may be staged against three types of governments--a civilian-led government chosen through civilian processes, a civilian-led government established by a prior military action, or a military government or junta. Two types of results may follow a coup--the establishment of a civilian-led government or the investiture of a military regime. Second, if no coup takes place during the nation-year, a typology is constructed using

a classification suggested by John Lovell.¹¹ Borrowing from Janowitz, Lovell makes a distinction between three levels of intensity or degree of military influence. In the first of these, the military would wield minimal political influence. At the second level, the military are influential but not the ruling group. Finally, at the highest level of influence, the military rule. To Janowitz's ranking of degree or intensity of influence, Lovell adds a second dimension--scope of influence. Thus, Lovell argues, a distinction can be made between the military as ruling elite and as ruling coalition; the military as predominant political bloc and as competitive political bloc; and the military as a praetorian army and as a public guard.

Table I presents diagrammatically the classification derived from the above typology along with a rank ordering of military intervention. The most extreme form of military intervention

- TABLE I HERE -

involves a coup d'etat against a civilian regime chosen by civilian processes. The least degree of military intervention is the case of a military with a low degree of influence and a limited scope of influence--the palace guard. With one notable exception, nation-years containing coups are ranked higher than nation-years without coups. This is because the coup by its very nature is the most extreme expression of the political power of the military. The sole exception is that of a coup against a military regime in which a civilian regime is estab-

lished. Since this is a reflection of an apparent withdrawal from the political arena (at least to a degree), it is ranked below the case of a military which maintains itself (i.e., no coup) as the ruling elite. Using this procedure, a score of 1 to 12 was assigned to each nation-year observation..¹²

The Independent Variables

There is no shortage in the literature of hypothetically relevant independent variables. On the basis of the literature, our own theoretical presuppositions, and data availability, the following independent variables were selected for examination:

System Level Independent Variables

Economic Development. An indicator of economic development was constructed on the basis of a principal components factor analysis of five measures of economic development; (1) per capita energy consumption; (2) installed energy capacity per capita; (3) per capita GDP; (4) cement output per thousand population; and (5) the log of percent GDP from agriculture.¹³ The factor analysis produced a single-factored solution explaining 89 percent of the total variance. From the factor coefficients, a single measure of economic development was derived for each of the 200 nation-year observations.

Social Mobilization. Similarly, a single measure of social mobilization was derived on the basis of a factor analysis of five indicators of social mobilization: (1) percent literate; (2) the log of university enrollment; (3) the log of per capita

newsprint consumption; (4) the log of telephones per 1000 population; and (5) the log of radio receivers per thousand population.¹⁴ A single-factor solution was produced explaining 73 percent of the total variance.

Intramilitary Variable

Military Size. This is simply the number of military personnel per capita. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain data to measure other conceivably relevant intramilitary variables.

Political Variables

Political Unrest. To measure political unrest, scores were obtained through a factor analysis of three events data indicators: (1) the log of deaths in domestic political violence; (2) the log of riots; and (3) the log of armed attacks.¹⁵ A single-factor solution was obtained explaining 70 percent of the total variance.

Government Sanctions. An events data indicator of actions "taken by authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself." Examples include censorship, restrictions on political participation, and arrests for espionage.¹⁶

Demonstrations. Also events data. "A protest demonstration is a nonviolent gathering of people organized to protest the policies, ideology, or actions of a regime, a government, or political leaders."¹⁷

Defense Spending. Proportion of the national budget designated

for defense.

Social Welfare Expenditures. Proportion of the budget set aside for health, educational, or welfare purposes.

Direct Taxes. Proportion of the total tax revenues derived from direct taxes.

Political Institutionalization. Three indicators were calculated as possible measures of this variable:

regime age--age of the current regime

party age--age of the government's party

party index--a ranking of the governing party on a scale from zero to six with the scores assigned on the following basis:

0 = no party (Rojas regime in Colombia)

1 = party exists essentially in name only. No autonomous organization. (ARENA in Brazil, 1965-1967)

3 = The party has some organization and a degree of independence, but the executive is loosely tied to the party and his power is not dependent upon the party (although the opposite may be the case). (Colorados during Stroessner's regime in more recent years.)

4 = Party has organization and autonomy. The citizen identifies with it as well as personalities. (Blancos, Colorados in Uruguay; Liberals, Conservatives in Colombia.)

5 = the party is more significant than the personality of its leaders. Organizational autonomy. (British parties.)

6 = Actual party government. Huntington's ideal of party government.

Short-term Performance Indicators

Annual Increase in GDP. Percent annual increase in per capita GDP. Tabulated for the year of and each of the two years preceding the nation-year observation thus allowing a time lag capability.

Annual Increase in Agricultural Production. Percent annual increase (or decrease).

Annual Increase in Manufacturing Production.

Export Surplus. Export surplus as a percent of total imports and exports. Two year time lag included.

Trend in Export Surplus. Percent annual increase in export surplus.

Cost of Living Increase. Annual percentage increase in the cost of living. Two year time lag included.

Military Intervention Against Civilian Regimes

There is no reason to assume that the causes of increased military involvement in the political system are identical under both civilian and military regimes. Indeed, it may be that factors which lead the military to intervene against a civilian regime (poor economic performance, for example) may be related to the decline of military involvement during a military regime. Expressed differently, factors decreasing a civilian regime's

legitimacy may also decrease that of a military regime. In the first case, the relation between those factors and military intervention would be positive; in the second case, negative. Thus, we decide to subset the data into nation-years of military rule and nation-years of civilian rule. The definition of a military government adopted here for this purpose is the following: a military government is a government headed by a military man (or men) which was established through an extra-constitutional seizure of power by the armed forces.¹⁸ A dichotomization of regimes into military and civilian is, admittedly, a distinction made on the grossest level of difference and, some would argue, a naive level.¹⁹ We chose this approach, however, for three reasons: (1) the question of differences in the causes of military involvement in domestic politics is theoretically interesting at this level; (2) there is no theoretically justifiable and easily coded classificatory scheme for military-civilian regimes that particularly appeals to the authors; and (3) even if such a scheme existed, it would reduce the number of cases in the analysis below a useful level. Using the military-civilian government dichotomy, there were approximately 150 nation-years of civilian government and 50 years of military rule during the time period.²⁰ Then, simple correlations were computed between each of the independent variables and military intervention.

The first impression one receives from Table II which presents the correlations between the independent variables and military intervention during years of civilian rule, is the absence of many high correlations. Negative findings, however, can often be as significant as positive findings. The data indicate no strong relationship between military intervention and such supposedly relevant system level independent variables as economic development and social mobilization thus contradicting hypotheses by ²¹Finer and ²²Huntington. Feit has argued that there is a positive relationship between small armies and military intervention, ²³ but there is no support for that thesis in this analysis. Also, the data show no strong correlations between the indicators of short run economic performance and military intervention. This finding fails to support the hypothesis ²⁴of Feeder.

Secondly, there is one variable that is related to military intervention in an unexpected manner. A negative relationship between defense spending and military intervention had been anticipated in that increased military intervention would come as a reaction to the cutting of the military budget. The data, however, show the opposite. The correlation between defense spending and military intervention is a positive .27. The explanation for this unexpected finding is that the causal relationship is reversed. Increased defense spending is the result rather than the cause of military political action. As the

military's influence in domestic politics increases, it is able to exact a greater share of the budgetary pie for its own use.

Finally, the table shows some relatively strong and theoretically significant correlations. First, there is a strong positive relationship between political unrest and military intervention (.39). The military which, according to Shils,²⁵ highly value order, look askance on a civilian regime incapable of maintaining order. At the same time, political unrest can be interpreted as a manifestation of declining support and decreasing legitimacy for the incumbent civilian regime.²⁶ The military, ever mindful of civil order (and, perhaps playing a moderator²⁷ role), intervene to restore order perhaps replacing the ineffective civilian government.²⁸ Secondly, Table II indicates a strong positive relationship between nonviolent political demonstrations and military intervention (.38). Although demonstrations are not signs of political disorder, they are indications of popular dissatisfaction with incumbent authorities, dissatisfaction which can lead to military intervention. Third, there is a positive relation between government sanctions and intervention (.37). This can be interpreted in two ways. Sanctions may be viewed as repressive actions that would tend to lower the support of key civilian elements for the regime or sanctions may be seen as the result of, rather than the cause of, military intervention. It may be that one policy demand of South American militaries is that governments employ sanctions

against political opponents. In the first interpretation, government sanctions are a cause of military intervention; in the second, an effect. Fourth, there are negative relationships between military intervention and social welfare spending (-.24) and the proportion of total taxes that are direct (-.19). Again, these can be interpreted in two ways: as independent variables affecting civilian support for the regime or a reflection of increased military influence in policy making.²⁹ Finally, there is a negative relationship between the indicators of political institutionalization (especially party age, -.24, and the party index, -.31) and military intervention. This, of course, is very much in accord with the theoretical perspectives of Huntington.³⁰

On the basis of the correlations, then, we have six possible variables--political unrest, government sanctions, demonstrations, social welfare spending, direct taxes, and the party index (as a measure of institutionalization)--for our regression model

$$MI = f(POLUN, GOVSAN, DEMS, SOCWEL, TAXES, PARTY)$$

Only three of these variables, however, political unrest, demonstrations, and the measure of institutionalization, are of unquestioned theoretical relevance. The other three may well be the effects rather than the causes of military intervention.³¹ When all six variables were considered in a least squares multiple regression analysis, this position was substantiated in that only three of the six variables proved significant in the

equation--political unrest, demonstrations, and the party index.

The standardized regression model of military intervention against a civilian government is the following:

$$MI = .28 FOLUN + .23 DEMS - .29 PARTY$$

Each of the individual predictors and the equation as a whole are significant at the .01 level. The multiple R is .53 and the R^2 is .28.

The findings of this research, then, are that military intervention against a civilian regime is the result of three factors which are directly related to the strength of and support for the incumbent civilian regime among both civilian and military elites. The regression analysis shows a positive and exponential relationship (because of the log transformation in the factor analysis) between military intervention and political unrest, a positive relation between military intervention and demonstrations, and a negative relation to party strength. Mounting political unrest and nonviolent demonstrations are direct indicators of declining support among civilians for the incumbent regime and indications to the military of the regime's declining legitimacy and inability to maintain order--a value highly regarded by military elites. On the other hand, there is a negative relation between party strength and intervention. Thus, a regime with organized support in the form of a political party, a more institutionalized regime, is able to weather political turbulence more successfully than a government with

little institutionalized support.

The conclusion is that the military intervenes against a civilian regime not because of such system level aggregate phenomena as economic development or social mobilization, not because of short run performance trends on the part of the government, but because of the regime's increasing inability to maintain domestic tranquility (measured by increases in political unrest), to sustain civilian support (measured by political unrest and demonstrations), and to institutionalize itself through a strong party system.

Military Withdrawal from Power

The question of the causes of military intervention against a civilian regime has been the topic of extensive investigation, but the reverse of the coin, military withdrawal from power, has been considered very little. Thus, we decided to use the same approach used in the analysis above to study the course of domestic military involvement during a military government's rule.

- TABLE III HERE -

From the figures presented in Table III, one can see that there are a number of relatively high correlations between military intervention and various independent variables. Theoretically, however, such variables as government sanctions (-.29), defense spending (-.42), social welfare spending (-.20),

and direct taxes (-.14) are more likely results of military rule than causes of it. ³³ Other variables, however, particularly political unrest (-.42), demonstrations (-.22), regime age (as a measure of institutionalization (.49), annual increase in agricultural production (.24), annual increase in manufacturing production (.32), and export surplus (including lagged variables, .29, .33, and .27) must be considered for theoretical as well as statistical reasons.

After multiple regression analysis, the number of independently significant variables was reduced to three--political unrest (POLUN), export surplus as $t - 1$ (EXT1), and regime age (REGAGE). The standardized regression equation is as follows:

$$MI = .28 \text{ EXT1} - .32 \text{ POLUN} + .35 \text{ REGAGE}$$

All of the independent variables and the equation as a whole are significant at the .01 level; multiple R is .63, R^2 is .40.

Once in power, then, the best predictors of the military's withdrawal from power (reversing the direction of military intervention) are increases in political unrest, a deteriorating balance of trade, and lack of institutionalization (here measured by regime age).

How, then, do the causes of military intervention in periods of civilian rule compare with causes of military intervention in times of military rule? There are striking similarities, but also significant differences. In both circumstances, the importance of political unrest cannot be overlooked. Political unrest

will stir the military to action against an incumbent civilian regime, but it will also hasten them back to their barracks during their own tenure as rulers. In both circumstances, institutionalization is important. The incumbent regime is more likely to remain in office be that regime civilian or military if it has achieved a degree of institutionalization.

There are also important differences in the causes of military involvement in domestic politics. First, demonstrations lead to intervention against a civilian regime, but are apparently negligibly related to the course of military involvement during periods of military rule. Against a civilian regime, nonviolent demonstrations indicate a decrease in civilian support for the incumbent regime both to the researcher and the military. Consequently, the military feel a greater degree of legitimacy in intervening. In periods of military rule, however, the military are less reliant upon positive civilian support³⁴ and less responsive to civilian demonstrations. Military rulers are more dependent upon intramilitary support than support from civilian groups; consequently, the importance of the indicators of short run economic performance in the correlations and the appearance of the export surplus indicator in the regression equation for military intervention during periods of military rule. The military, it has been argued,³⁵ have modernizing values;³⁶ so, one would expect military rulers to attempt to affect economic modernization. Economic failures would lead

to decreased support for ruling military elites among important groups within the military itself. Thus, declining economic performance leads to decreased intramilitary support for the military regime and is thus a factor in the military's return to their barracks.

Notes

We wish to thank John S. Ambler, Robert H. Dix, Fred R. von der Mehden, and T. A. Ward for their kind assistance in this research endeavor.

1

For a general bibliography, see Kurt Lang, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War: A Review of the Literature with Annotated Bibliography (Beverly Hills, 1972); for a review of some of the literature dealing with Latin America in particular, see L. N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, II (1966), 5ff.

2

See, among others, Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York, 1962); Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," Archives Europeenes de Sociologie, II (Spring, 1961), 62-81; Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review, LXII (Sept., 1968), 1125-1143; Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (1960), 745ff.; and Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups D'Etat in Latin America," Journal of Peace Research, IV (1967), 228-251.

3

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, 1957); Robert F. Adie and Guy E. Poitras, Latin America: The

Politics of Immobility (Englewood Cliffs, 1974); Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America (Garden City, New York, 1962); and Alexander, "The Army in Politics," in Government and Politics in Latin America, Harold E. Davies, ed. (New York, 1958).

⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (April, 1965), 386-430; Finer, op. cit.; Wyckoff, op. cit.; Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971), and William R. Thompson, "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup," Comparative Politics, VII (July, 1975), 459-488.

⁵ See Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Science Review, LX (1966), 616-626; Stepan, op. cit.; William R. Thompson, "Systemic Change and the Latin American Military Coup," Comparative Political Studies, VII (Jan., 1975), 441-459; and the author's "The Relation of Trends in Economic and Political Performance to Coups D'Etat in South America, 1950-1967," (1974).

⁶ Stepan, op. cit., 7.

⁷ With the passage of time, of course, it will be possible to extend the data set into the 1970s. When this is done, we hope to compare military intervention in different time periods; e. g., that before 1965 with that after 1965.

⁸ Sources for the data include the following: United Nations Statistical Yearbooks, Economic Bulletin for Latin America; U. N. Demographic Yearbook, U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts Statis-

tics, Statesmans Yearbook, Americana Yearbook, International Financial Statistics, World Almanac, Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators; Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65 (New York, 1966); Report of the U. N. Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia (1951); Overseas Economic Survey: Uruguay 1950 and 1954 (London); Pedro C. M. Teichert, Economic Policy and Industrialization in Latin America (Oxford, Miss.; 1959), and James W. Wilkie, The Bolivian Revolution and U. S. Aid Since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969). Although every effort was made to secure accurate and complete data through the use of multiple sources and extensive cross-checking, the usual caveats about South American statistical information cannot be disregarded. Isolated missing data points were filled in by linear interpolation (ca. 8 percent missing data). When this was inappropriate, the observation was deleted from the particular computation.

9

See the author's "Military Intervention: In Search of a Dependent Variable," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, III (1975).

10

John P. Lovell, "An Introductory Essay," in The Military and Politics in Five Developing Nations, Lovell, ed. (Kessington, Md., 1970).

11

Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, 1964).

12

We do not pretend that this measure of military intervention does not contain a certain measure of subjectivity. The correlation between this index of military intervention and that of Robert Putnam is .72. See Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," World Politics, XX (Oct., 1967), 83-110.

13

Thus, the factor analysis assumes a linear relation among all indicators except percent GDP from agriculture. The assumed relation between it and each of the other indicators is exponential.

14

The assumption is that of an exponential relationship among all the indicators except percent literate.

15

The data are from Taylor and Hudson, op. cit. The log transformation assumes an exponential rather than a linear relationship among the variables--a sound assumption both theoretically and statistically.

16

Ibid., 69.

17

Ibid., 88.

18

See the author's "The Performance of Military Governments in South America, 1948-1967," (1975), 1-2.

19

See Claude E. Welch, "Whither the Study of the role of the Military in Politics," International Studies Notes, I (Spring, 1974).

20

The n varies because of the omission of certain cases containing missing data for which no reasonable interpolation

was possible. For purposes of this study, the year of the coup was considered as a year of civilian rule.

21

Op. cit., 87-88, 113-115.

22

Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay,"

op. cit.

23

Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, (Boston, 1973), 5-8.

24

Needler, op. cit., 624.

25

Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," 7-68 in John J. Johnson, ed. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962), 54.

26

It may be that the relationship between economic and political performance and military intervention is mediated through political unrest. This awaits further analysis.

27

See Stepan. op. cit.

28

The causes of political unrest are a highly significant question in this context. Although not considered here, that question is the object of the author's continued research.

29

"The Performance of Military Governments in South America, 1948-1967," op. cit. examines this latter possibility from a somewhat different perspective.

30

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), esp. Ch. 4.

31

This was the position taken in "The Performance of Military Governments in South America, 1948-1967," op. cit.

32

This is one of the primary findings of another paper of

America: 1948-1967," (1975).

33

the author's: "Civilian and Military Regime Priorities, South America: 1948-1967," (1975).

33

See "The Performance of Military Governments in South America: 1948-1967," op. cit.

34

Ibid.

35

See Shils, op. cit.; and Lucien W. Pye, "Arms in the Process of Political Modernization," in Johnson, op. cit.,

69-89.

36

See "Civilian and Military Regime Priorities, South America: 1948-1967," op. cit.

TABLE I

A Rank-Ordering of Military Intervention

A coup has occurred:

Against whom?	Establishes what?	
	Civilian	Military
	gov.	gov.
Military gov.	6	8
Civilian gov. estb. by mil.	9	10
Civilian gov.	11	12

No coup has occurred:

Scope of Military influence			
Degree of influence	-----		
		extensive	limited
	high	7	5
	medium	4	3
	low	2	1

TABLE II

Correlations with Military Intervention
- Civilian Government -

Variable	Correlation with MI
Economic Development	-.09
Social Mobilization	-.10
Military Size	.07
Political Unrest	.39
Government Sanctions	.37
Demonstrations	.38
Defense Spending	.27
Social Welfare Expenditures	-.24
Direct Taxes	-.19
Regime Age	-.07
Party Age	-.24
Party Index	-.31
Annual Increase in GDP	.00
Annual Increase in GDP, t - 1	.17
Annual Increase in GDP, t - 2	.16
Annual Increase in Agricultural Production	.00
Annual Increase in Manufacturing Production	.06
Export Surplus	.11
Export Surplus, t - 1	.06
Export Surplus, t - 2	.09
Trend in Export Surplus	.03
Cost of Living Increase	-.05
Cost of Living Increase, t - 1	-.05
Cost of Living Increase, t - 2	-.02

N = ca. 150

TABLE III

Correlations with Military Intervention
- Military Government -

Variable	Correlation with MI
Economic Development	.20
Social Mobilization	-.08
Military Size	.04
Political Unrest	-.42
Government Sanctions	-.29
Demonstrations	-.22
Defense Spending	-.42
Social Welfare Spending	-.20
Direct Taxes	-.14
Regime Age	.49
Party Age	.06
Party Index	.02
Annual Increase in GDP	.14
Annual Increase in GDP, t - 1	.05
Annual Increase in GDP, t - 2	.15
Annual Increase in Agricultural Production	.24
Annual Increase in Manufacturing Production	.32
Export Surplus	.29
Export Surplus, t - 1	.33
Export Surplus, t - 2	.27
Trend in Export Surplus	-.07
Cost of Living Increase	-.02
Cost of Living Increase, t - 1	.07
Cost of Living Increase, t - 2	.05

n = ca. 50